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THINKING BIG ABOUT THE SMALL FOOTPRINT: MAKING STRATEGY FOR A SECURITY COOPERATION CAMPAIGN IN BURMA

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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13 February 2014

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Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Paul Pendleton is assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. He has commanded a special operations squadron, leading the stand-up the Air Force's first MC-130J unit, and has served as a deputy commander for a special operations group**.** Lt Col Pendleton is a master navigator with over 3,200 flight hours, mostly in special operations C-130 aircraft. He has flown combat missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations and has held a variety of assignments including executive officer, chief of standardizations and evaluations, and chief of current operations. Lt Col Pendleton also served as South Asia Branch Chief and Pakistan Desk Officer for U.S. Central Command's security cooperation division. He graduated from *The* Ohio State University with a BA in English, received his commission through Officer Training School, and graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School's irregular warfare master's degree program.

Abstract

Burma (Myanmar) is in the midst of an exceptional transition from rule by dictatorship to becoming a more democratic state. The biggest threats to this transition are the ethnic insurgencies that have existed since the country's independence. The United States has increased engagement with Burma but if the administration chooses to deepen relations to facilitate this transition, Burma's military, the country's most powerful political actor, must be the central target in order to deal with the insurgency problem. Such engagement would likely take the form of a military-to-military security cooperation campaign, and this study surveys the limitations of making strategy for these campaigns and then proposes a methodology for accomplishing this. Current guidance drives rigid end states and the removal of strategy from a deep knowledge of the environment, and therefore a better way to conceive strategy for a security cooperation campaign is to envision, through analysis, a better state of affairs. To achieve this better state, the strategist must understand the context and then apply theory that then results in the creation of strategic goals. Applying this methodology to the Burma case, this paper finds that there are two applicable theories: democratization and counterinsurgency. These theories, along with the contextual elements, generate two main strategic categories with five nested strategic goals. First, the strategy should aim to secure the population, using efforts to halt abuses of ethnic groups and provide physical security for the population. Second, the strategy should strive to connect the government to the ethnic populations, using efforts to stabilize ethnic areas, address the populations' needs in these areas, and enhance the government's legitimacy and control at the same time.

Introduction

In 2010, Burma (or Myanmar) began to transition from its decades-old rule by military dictatorship to a more democratic regime. The country held elections, sat an elected Parliament, and the military released political prisoners like opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. This series of exceptional events, along with the new government's overtures to the United States to expand diplomatic, military, and economic ties, ushered in new opportunities for engagement.

Closer ties between the two countries may be in the offing. The Department of State has reestablished full diplomatic relations, maintaining a policy of "action-for-action" to "support Burma's political and economic reforms; promote national reconciliation; … and promote responsible international engagement and human rights."[1] Should the administration decide to deepen ties with Burma even further, Burma's military, the *Tatmadaw*, must be the prime target of engagement as it is the country's most powerful political actor. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), an institution with deep experience studying Burma, notes as much, recommending more engagement with the Tatmadaw to guide it through democratization.[2]

Military outreach would fall under the heading of *security cooperation*, a collection of shaping activities such as military engagement, training, advising, and Security Force Assistance.[3] Formulating a strategy for a targeted, country-specific security cooperation campaign is, however, a difficult task for two reasons. First, in this case, the United States must seek to enable Burma's democratic transition while also reconciling the country's various insurgent groups with the government. Administration policy recognizes this situation, supporting the government's legitimacy while simultaneously requiring this government to act toward achieving "ethnic reconciliation" and "pursuing dialogue with ethnic minorities"[4] to realize "national reconciliation in Burma."[5] This is no small task given the long history of

conflict between the government and resistance groups. Second, there is insufficient guidance for building security cooperation strategy. In a situation like Burma's, advisors must work by, with, and through host nation (HN) forces to effect change. That the Tatmadaw has a terrible human rights record with respect to the ethnic groups greatly complicates this arrangement. The setting of strategic goals for security cooperation that are tailored to this delicate situation thus assumes a crucial importance, but planning guidance does not effectively address this challenge in such a context. Instead, existing guidance drives the strategist toward rigid finalities or isolates the making of strategy from the consideration of the situation on the ground.

What, therefore, should be the United States military's strategy for engaging the Tatmadaw in a potential security cooperation campaign? This study proposes that a strategy should aim to work with the Tatmadaw to both secure the ethnic populations and legitimately connect the government with them. These two broad categories of goals emerge from the combination of three approaches to the problem. First, the study surveys the inadequacies of current guidance and proposes a different method of creating security cooperation strategy. This concept proposes that strategy should not strive for an end state but instead for a better situation. Next, the study briefly surveys Burma's current situation with respect to its numerous ethnic insurgencies. This establishes the understanding of the environment from which to tailor a strategy. Finally, the paper examines concepts from democratization and counterinsurgency (COIN) theories to match the assessment of the environment's needs, ultimately arriving at the strategic goals. By using this methodology, the United States can achieve a better state of affairs in Burma despite the limitations of working by, with, and through the Tatmadaw.

This paper is necessarily limited in scope for the broad and underexplored topics of both security cooperation strategy and engagement with Burma. While important in implementing

any strategy, the identification of resources, methods, or measures of effectiveness is beyond the scope of this paper. Nor does it discuss responsibilities of the various levels of military staffs in creating and implementing this strategy. Additionally, the paper only presents the basics of the enormously complex insurgencies that exist in Burma. The aim here is instead to advance the current state of thinking about the art of creating strategy for security cooperation and for imagining new ways to address Burma's problems.

Toward an End State or a Better State?

Conceptualizing Security Cooperation Strategy

Shaping activities are poised to assume a much greater role in our national military strategy. Per the Department of Defense's 2012 *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,* "the U.S. will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability" while seeking to be "the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships … this is to occur with "small-footprint approaches" including "advisory capabilities."[6] In Burma's case, the small-footprint vehicle would be the military engagement and training capabilities offered under the broad heading of security cooperation. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations,* defines security cooperation as "DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military and security capabilities for internal and external defense for and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to the HN [Host Nation]."[7] Security cooperation provides the method by which the military can shape the situation in a sovereign country by, with, and through the HN's own forces.

Even though security cooperation acts indirectly, it must still have guidance – a strategy – in order to satisfy policy, for "strategy is the bridge that relates military power to political purpose."[8] In many cases, security cooperation actions simply take their strategy from the geographic combatant commander's Theater Campaign Plan. Small engagement efforts that target a specific tactical change can easily nest under the plan's broad strategy. Yet theater goals cannot meet the needs of larger security cooperation campaigns that seek to change a given situation in a fundamental sense. These campaigns must be tailored to the context at hand and therefore need their own strategies. In recent history, the large COIN assistance programs in Colombia, Pakistan, and the Philippines have each had their own strategies that were independent of yet consistent with theater strategy.

Such is the case in Burma. As the following sections will demonstrate, the Tatmadaw needs to change its very nature to achieve further democratization. This in turn requires the synchronized effort of a campaign with its own strategy. Existing doctrine does not however provide sufficient guidance for establishing strategy in security cooperation campaigns. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning,* purportedly for use across the range of military actions, is written in a deterministic and kinetic sense and is insufficient for two important reasons. First, it requires the establishment of an "end state," which is "the set of conditions to meet conflict termination criteria."[9] Setting concrete end states can make achieving lofty and specific conditions impossible when the situation's variables act in unforeseen ways. This is especially true in environments where our military forces work by, with, and through HN forces.[10]

Second, JP 5-0 relegates security cooperation to a *de facto* supporting role for kinetic operations. Security cooperation in this publication dwells within operational phases that are defined by a specific "focus" of action, including "Shape (Phase 0)," "Deter (Phase I)," and

"Enable Civil Authority (Phase V)." Phases from 0 to V are sequential and the focus each phase relates to the level of kinetic military effort required.[11] "Dominate (Phase III)," for example, consists of "overmatching joint force capability at the critical time and place" to "control the situation or operational environment."[12] It is difficult to conceive a shaping effort playing more than a supporting role in this phase. Security cooperation in the JP 5-0 context is therefore an enabler for and an adjunct to the application of force.

The Defense Department's *Theater Campaign Planning: Planner's Handbook* begins to move the security cooperation strategist in the right direction, coordinating "Phase 0 and steady state activities across the AOR."[13] The publication is therefore the rough, non-combat equivalent to JP 5-0 for use by geographic combatant commands. Like JP 5-0, the *Planner's Handbook* also falls short of providing useful strategic guidance for a campaign. This publication states that the classified publications *Guidance for the Employment of the Force* and *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* provide the strategic end states to the planner. He or she should then conduct a "mission analysis … identifying and describing threats and opportunities associated with the theater strategic end states. Planners should identify political, military, economic, or other factors in the region that facilitate or hinder progress toward the achievement of theater strategic end states such as key audience perceptions and reactions."[14] Country plans, the publication notes, follow the same template but require additional analysis of the ambassador's guidance, the security situation in the HN, and the role the HN will play in the regional security framework.[15]

The problem here is twofold. First, as discussed above, is the rigidity of the end state, the concept of which does not mesh well with security cooperation. Second, the operational planning construct removes the making of strategy from the assessment of the operational environment. While small-scale security cooperation actions may support the broader theater

strategy, the strategy for a larger security cooperation campaign must exist directly in relation to the events on the ground in the target country. If not, efforts will be at best uncoordinated and at worst counterproductive or dangerous. The traditional planning construct does not work well for security cooperation campaigns, as strategy and tactics are already directly interdependent and do not require operational level actions to connect them.

The strategist must resolve the twin problems of overly rigid end states and the removal of the formulation of strategy from the operational environment in order to create truly effective security cooperation strategy. This of course necessitates a shift in strategic thinking from existing methods. One such departure from this status quo exists in the works of Brigadier General Waas de Czege, USA, retired. He writes of the error of considering the operational level to be a distinct level of war, arguing that strategy, "choosing the best way forward … from [the] current position," and tactics, the "reasoning backward" from a concrete end, are the only two levels that exist. "Operational art," he says, is not contained within a discrete level of war but instead is the constant synchronization of strategy and tactics that occurs at all levels.[16] Waas de Czege further notes: "strategy is mostly conceptualizing or 'framing' the problem … that tactics will solve concretely." Regarding the concept of end states, he asserts that, "given the unbounded and unfamiliar nature of the situation, it is difficult to articulate a conceptual end that is desirable, convincingly achievable, and broad enough to embrace a spectrum from the merely tolerable to the truly advantageous."[17] Within these concepts lies the thinking necessary to cover the doctrinal shortfalls.

Waas de Czege's two broad ideas – creating strategy is the act of choosing the best way forward upon framing the problem, and the strategic goal must be broad in scope and expectation – provides the strategist with an effective way to develop security cooperation strategy. While

written for kinetic operations strategy, his ideas are especially applicable in security cooperation campaigns where strategy and tactics are interdependent. What the development of a strategy for Burma therefore needs is the conceptualization of a sound way forward that accounts for the myriad of contextual factors.

Assessing the Environment: Burma's Ethnic Insurgencies

To frame the problem in Burma, the strategist must understand the country's inter-ethnic dynamics. The United States maintains a single policy for Burma (as it should) yet the strategist must be careful not to consider Burma's people as a homogenous entity. While ethnic Burmese account for the majority of of the population, fully one third is comprised of ethnic minorities. There are six main minority groups: Shan, Karen, Rakhine, Chinese, Indian, and Mon. These minority groups largely occupy the country's under-governed spaces and, unsurprisingly, account for the bulk of the unrest and communal violence. Buddhist (ethnic Rakhine) versus Muslim (ethnic Rohingya) violence continues to wrack the western state of Rakhine. Eight major ethnic insurgencies, mostly in the north and east border areas, are either ongoing or are subject to recent ceasefires that followed the central government's (based in the new capital city of Naypyidaw since 2006) outreach after 2010. As the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) notes, "reconciliation with the ethnic groups is fundamental to Myanmar's reform process and political stability."[18] Since ethnic violence constitutes perhaps the biggest challenge to Burma's stability, the strategist must understand the dynamics.

Most of the ethnic insurgencies have been waged on and off since Burma's independence in 1948.[19] Historically, the Tatmadaw's vision of a central, authoritarian state, united as "one blood, one voice, one command,"[20] clashed with the various groups' designs. The "Republic of the Union of Burma," the post-war country that "bore little resemblance to any nation or state

from the historic past,"[21] was immediately beset by rebellions of ethnic groups who were traditionally independent or autonomous in previous kingdoms. As the government continued to assert central control, neglecting needs in various ethnic areas, more groups rose up in rebellion. As more insurgencies sprang up, the Tatmadaw further consolidated its own power due to a perceived need to maintain state control. This cycle of ethnic violence and repression, interspersed with grassroots democratic uprisings, ultimately resulted in military overthrow of two elected governments and a military dictatorship that lasted until 2011.

Non-state armed groups currently under ceasefire agreements with Naypyidaw include the Karen National Liberation Army, Kareni Army, Shan State Army-South, Mon National Liberation Army, and Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, and the United Wa State Army. The ceasefire with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) broke down in June 2011 after failing to reach an agreement about inclusion of the KIA in Naypyidaw's proposed national Border Guard Force, a jointly controlled, localized militia. Naypyidaw had successfully used this concept to secure ceasefires with other groups.[22] This follows the trend started in 1989 wherein the government traded local autonomy and political support for the central government for ceasefires. These arrangements are at best temporary, more stalemates than permanent solutions,[23] making their durability questionable.

Despite the turbulent history, the conditions for a more enduring stability are now better than they have probably ever been in Burma's existence. While it is largely an "unanswered question" as to what each ethnic group really wants in exchange for full reconciliation,[24] the insurgencies revolve around a loosely shared set of grievances. These include the achievement of ethnic rights and autonomy, securing rights to resources on ethnic lands, and stopping abuses historically perpetrated by a government dominated by ethnic Burmese.[25] These shared goals

have not changed throughout the long histories of the various insurgencies, but among many of the insurgent groups, there is now a palpable "war weariness."[26] The country's nascent liberalization, along with Naypyidaw's outreach to the United States, constitutes a window of opportunity to liberalize the country.

The government has already reached out to most of the insurgent groups proactively since 2010 to reduce violence. Efforts are ongoing at the time of this study[27] but there has been little progress toward resolution of the core issues. As the CSIS notes:

> There still does not appear to be the sustained and high-level focus on political empowerment of the ethnic minorities that is necessary before stability, reconciliation, and development can occur. … Even in areas where ceasefires have been signed, government troops have not been withdrawn; ethnic leaders say that they continue to face human rights violations and that many of their former fields are still heavily mined.[28]

Effecting changes within the Tatmadaw therefore constitutes the central requirement in stabilizing the country. The Tatmadaw must be the main effort.

Deriving Strategic Goals: Context and Concepts

While surveying the environment is of vital importance, it is not enough to merely stop here and force an idea on top of the context. How, for instance, should the Tatmadaw be changed? If reconciling the ethnic conflicts is crucial stabilizing the country, what should guide engagement of the Tatmadaw to convey this? This is where theory can help; it provides concepts to shape the thinking about the desired environment.

In essence, the project in Burma is one of democratization, or more specifically the continued transition from Tatmadaw-led authoritarianism to democracy. Charles Tilly's work provides concepts applicable to the democratization imperative. He describes the character of a regime's adherence to democracy as "the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected, and mutually binding consultation." Democratization, he

notes, occurs when a state exhibits "net movement … toward the higher ends of [these] four dimensions."[29] Engagement then must account for these concepts.

Following this criteria, four political requisites must be met for Burma to successfully transition to a more democratic system of governance. These include the establishment of a more federalized system that grants more autonomy and equality to ethnic states and populations, a provision of security for them, and inclusion of these populations in a "mutually binding" form of governance.[30] The Tatmadaw must take several necessary steps that are concurrent with Naypyidaw's establishment of these conditions. First, the military must continue to transition power to a fully elected government; this task is only partially complete. Currently, 25% of Parliament's seats are filled by military appointees (there is a constitutional requirement for the military to make up at least 25% of the body) yet military leaders may be open to voluntarily loosening their grip and either reducing or eliminating this requirement.[31] Second, the military must subordinate itself to civilian rule. This is easier said than done, as the history of the Tatmadaw leadership is replete with assertions that "the army is the only force in Burma … incapable of political bias," therefore justifying military coups when the country faces instability.[32] Third, the military must cease abuses against the populations in the ethnic areas. "Human rights violations and the displacement of villagers continue" across the country and addressing these problems has become a precondition for United States assistance.[33] Brutal and indiscriminate methods historically used to counter insurgencies are antithetical to the development of governmental legitimacy. Finally, the Tatmadaw needs to transition its operations in ethnic areas to focus on stability once an initial ceasefire is in place. Even if the military stops its persecution of the ethnic population, it will still be the country's primary security force. It will undoubtedly be difficult for a force historically employed against ethnic

insurgents to assume the role of providing security for the same population from which the insurgencies emerged. Such a transition is crucial, but the Tatmadaw has already approached the United States to ask for assistance in making such a leap.

Given these four contextual requirements for the Tatmadaw – continuing to transfer power and subordinating itself to the elected government, stopping abuses against ethnic populations, and transitioning to stability operations in ethnic areas (fig. 1) – it is clear that a security cooperation approach must consider Burma's political environment as foundation of an engagement program. While diplomacy must be the primary vehicle used to meet the first two goals (with supporting efforts by military forces, to be sure), the second two would fall under the purview of military engagement.

<u>Diplomacy-led</u>
1. Military subordinates itself to civilian government
2. Military fully transfers power to civilian government

<u>Military-led</u>
3. Stop abuses of ethnic groups
4. Stabilize ethnic areas consistent with tenets of democratization

Figure 1: Four contextual goals for democratic transition

These goals address the democratic transition, but this constitutes only a partial answer to the Tatmadaw's problem in Burma. The biggest obstacles to the country's unity and stability are the ethnic revolts.[34] The government's violent crackdowns aimed at the ethnic populations left almost no ethnic trust in Naypyidaw. This means that, even if the Tatmadaw stopped abuses, it would have a difficult time stabilizing ethnic areas since the lack of trust translates into a lack of legitimacy. Additionally, resolving the United States' two policy goals of recognizing both the central government *and* the rights of the ethnic groups necessitates a rebuilding of trust.

Bridging this trust gap thus assumes a central importance and COIN theory provides the thinking needed to address the issue. One preeminent COIN theorist, David Galula, notes that political goals lie at the heart of an insurgency, whose forces are weaker, by definition, than the forces they fight. Waging guerilla war via the population is the only feasible method for these forces to accomplish their political goals.[35] He writes:

> If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness.
>
> Thus the battle for the population is a major characteristic of the revolutionary war.[36]

An insurgency thus pits a weaker actor against a stronger one in pursuit of a political objective and accomplishes this through the medium of the population. Traditional use of heavy-handed force in COIN, therefore, is not effective, as the center of gravity is always the population and force used against the population only increases the divisions between it and the government. This is especially true in Burma where the goal is that ethnic populations are equal citizens.

Gordon McCormick's "Diamond Model" of insurgency (fig. 2) further illustrates this relationship, highlighting the population as the center of gravity and thus the necessary focus of action. In counterinsurgency, "popular support can be viewed as a zero-sum game, which implies that one side's loss is the other's gain and vice versa. Strengthening ties with the local populace by focusing on their needs and security denies or degrades insurgent influence over the people and leads to information revealing insurgent infrastructure."[37] The key is to establish the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the population by showing the ability and will to provide security and address grievances.[38] The application of this model rests in Leg 1 of the model. This portion of the model consists of three goals: provide security for the population, provide for

needs of the population (public services), and enhance legitimacy of the central government among the population through addressing grievances.



Figure 2: McCormick's "Diamond" counterinsurgency model
(Reprinted from Greg Wilson, "The Mystic Diamond: Applying the Diamond Model of Counterinsurgency in the Philippines," in *Gangs and Guerillas: Ideas from Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism*, eds. Michael Freeman and Hy Rothstein (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 16.)

As already mentioned, Burma constitutes a unique environment, one in which the United States needs to recognize and promote the rights of both the central government and the ethnic groups. Separate facets of the same liberalization task, including the pursuit of democratization as well as ethnic reconciliation, thus drives need to consider tenets of democratization and COIN theory. The goals that emerge from these analyses (fig. 1) exhibit significant overlap. From the perspective of the ethnic populations, the democratic goal of stopping abuses is directly related to the broader COIN goals of providing security and meeting the population's needs. Similarly, Naypyidaw's legitimacy among the ethnic populations would increase from both stabilizing ethnic territory and providing for the needs of the population. By stopping ethnic abuses, the

Tatmadaw can take steps toward establishing legitimacy and control and enhancing ethnic groups' security. Stabilizing the ethnic groups' areas can also enhance security while setting conditions needed to address the ethnic populations' grievances.

These elements can be combined into two distinct yet complementary categories: *secure the population* and *connect the government to the population* (fig. 3). The former includes the democratic goal of stopping abuses as well as the COIN goal of providing security. The latter includes the democratic goal of stabilizing ethnic areas along with the COIN goals of focusing on the population's needs and enhancing legitimacy and control.



Figure 3. Five strategic goals in two categories

Thus the assessment of the operational environment, combined with elements of the two theories, yields a concise presentation of the strategic goals for use in a security cooperation campaign in Burma. From the left side of the figure, the military would engage the Tatmadaw to secure the population through targeted training events aimed at stopping the abuses of the ethnic groups and providing them security. Examples of turning these goals into action would include events like facilitating the establishment of a third party to monitor interactions between the military and the ethnics, training the Tatmadaw in human rights and the law of armed conflict, and encouraging the integration of ethnic security forces in the national system. The latter goal

is especially important as it currently forms the crux of ongoing discussions between the parties. A proposal for the ethnic forces to participate in the military-led Border Guard Force is already on the table, and is likely the key to disarming several of the insurgencies.

From the right side of the figure, the military would engage to connect Naypyidaw to the population through events aimed at stabilizing ethnic areas, meeting the population's needs, and enhancing governmental legitimacy and control. Application would include actions such as facilitating Tatmadaw-run relief areas in or near ethnic zones, training the military on the importance of public services (while working with the diplomatic side to ensure services are extended to uncovered areas), and developing formal methods for inducting ethnic minority volunteers into the Tatmadaw. Finally, the overlap between the two categories is clear; for example, incorporating ethnic security forces into the Tatmadaw, while designed to provide security, also increases legitimacy and control and has a stabilizing function.

Conclusion

Context and theory each play necessary roles in the development of security cooperation strategy but neither is alone sufficient. Assessing the environment identifies the main actors, tendencies of the situation, and the main crux of the problem. Concepts taken from theories related to the situation then help channel the contextual elements into a framed problem, which begets an actionable strategy. Following this methodology, a security cooperation strategy in Burma should have two main efforts. First, the strategy should aim to secure the population, using efforts to halt abuses of ethnic groups and provide physical security for the population. Second, the strategy should strive to connect the government to the ethnic populations, using efforts to stabilize ethnic areas, address the populations' needs in these areas, and enhance the government's legitimacy and control at the same time. This strategy also presents a way of

acting toward a better situation in Burma without constraining the campaign with potentially unachievable end states.

While this paper strives to create a strategy there are clearly other facets of the situation that it does not address. The political decision to engage more deeply with Burma, for instance, is of prime importance but is fraught with domestic and regional political implications, including potential adverse reactions from China. It is also an open question as to whether or not the ethnic groups and the Tatmadaw can ever bridge the trust gap due to the latter's history of abuses. Additionally, the Tatmadaw may decide that it will not cede any more power or control than it already has, making engagement toward democratization largely irrelevant. So many political variables affect the situation in Burma that, even if conditions align to warrant a security cooperation campaign, it may achieve only limited gains despite the suitability of the strategy.

This study also identifies the need for more study in two further areas. First, existing security cooperation guidance is woefully short on direction for framing a country's problem and connecting theater-level planning with Department of State guidance in order to synthesize an approach. The vast bulk of security cooperation guidance instead aims at managing the dizzying array of funding streams. Second, existing planning guidance does not sufficiently address small-footprint, by-with-through missions. This area needs significant work if these types of operations are to be effective.

The *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership* guidance indicates that security cooperation campaigns are to be an increasingly important part of the United States military's repertoire. Their success, like their kinetic campaign counterparts', hinges upon sound strategic thinking that guides tactical action. By conceiving of a better situation that can be implemented by HN forces, closely analyzing the operational environment, and employing theoretical concepts when

needed, the strategist can effectively guide our military's engagement actions. Burma's case demonstrates this, and this example should stimulate the strategy-to-task dialogue at all levels.

Notes

1. U.S Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Fact Sheet, "U.S. Relations with Burma," http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35910.htm

2. Ernest Bower, Michael Green, Christopher Johnson, and Murray Hiebert, *CSIS Myanmar Trip Report: State of the Nation and Recommendations for U.S. Policy*, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington D.C.: CSIS, September 2012), 3.

3. Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), V-10.

4. U.S Department of State Fact Sheet, "U.S. Relations with Burma."

5. Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Violence in Burma's Rakhine State," U.S. Department of State Press Release, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/06/192114.htm

6. Office of the Secretary of Defense pamphlet, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, January 2012.

7. Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, V-10.

8. Colin Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17.

9. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), III-21.

10. Connie Veilette, *Plan Colombia: A Progress Report* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, June 2005), 2-3. There is an established body of literature about the shifting U.S. end states in Afghanistan and Iraq, but even shaping campaigns have been subject to failures to meet original, overreaching goals. This report assesses progress toward meeting Plan Colombia's overreaching main goal – preventing the "flow of illegal drugs into the United States" – as virtually nonexistent. Five years after the beginning of the campaign, the report notes, "the availability, price, and purity of cocaine and heroin in the United States have remained stable. Colombia produces most of the world supply, with 90% of the cocaine entering the United States originating in or transiting through Colombia."

11. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, III-42, III-38-39.

12. Ibid., III-43.

13. *Theater Campaign Planning: Planner's Handbook* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, February 2012), 1.

14. Ibid., 9.

15. Ibid., 12-15.

16. Huba Waas de Czege, "Thinking and Acting like an Early Explorer: Operational Art is not a Level of War," *Small Wars Journal* (14 March 2011), 2-4. In this article Waas de Czege

also notes that he was responsible for creating the false operational level of war as a writer of doctrine in the 1980s.

17. Huba Waas de Czege, "Operational Art: Continually Making Two Kinds of Choices in Harmony While Learning and Adapting," *Army Magazine* (September 2011), 48-49.

18. Bower et al., *CSIS Myanmar Trip Report*, 6.

19. Lawrence E. Cline, "Insurgency in amber: ethnic opposition groups in Myanmar," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 20, nos. 3-4 (December 2009), 576.

20. Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity* (New York, NY: Zed Books, 1999), 196.

21. Ibid., 27.

22. Urmila Venugopalan, ed., *Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments, Southeast Asia: Myanmar* (Alexandria, VA: IHS Jane's, 2013), 508-509.

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